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In August 2007 the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will celebrate its fortieth an-
niversary as a regional security arrangement. Over this period it has enjoyed a
somewhat checkered history. In its ªrst decade, its founding members rarely
met. In its second, it played a diplomatic role in the resolution of the Indochina
conºict. In its third decade, it widened its embrace to include the grouping’s
former antagonist, Vietnam, as well as Burma-Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos;
and it extended its diplomatic style into Northeast Asia via the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF). The same decade also saw ASEAN encountering an
unsettling ªnancial crisis, as well as political and economic uncertainty, which
fueled religious and ethnic discord along with environmental and boundary
disputes. Its fourth decade, nevertheless, witnessed ASEAN extending its in-
stitutional reach. After 1997 ASEAN held regular summits with China, Japan,
and South Korea in an arrangement termed, unimaginatively, ASEAN Plus
Three (APT). This mechanism, however, incubated the embryonic, and rhetori-
cally more exciting, East Asian Community, whose fertilization occurred in
Kuala Lumpur in December 2005.
This incremental evolution earned plaudits from the region’s political lead-
ers and from a wider scholarly community that had, in a variety of second-
track forums, become increasingly involved in the emerging arrangement’s
self-deªnition. Reviewing the ªeld, in 2004 Anthony Smith maintained that
“the consensus on ASEAN through to the early 1990s amongst many scholars
and journalists was that it was a body without parallel in the developing
world.”1
In 1997 ASEAN was stirred, but not unduly shaken, by the Asian ªnancial
crisis. The crisis apparently galvanized the association into deepening its
integration and projecting its socialization and managerial processes into
Northeast Asia. For Singapore’s enduring ambassador-at-large, Tommy Koh,
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the crisis “stimulated a new sense of East Asian regionalism.”2 Regional schol-
arship reinforced regional aspiration. As early as 1997 ASEAN scholar Amitav
Acharya wondered whether the ASEAN way would in time transform itself
into the Asia-Paciªc way.3 By 2000 Peter Katzenstein declared that East Asian
regional integration was “an idea whose time has come.”4
Indeed, given the positive evaluations of an expanded ASEAN machinery
“to socialize the [East Asian] region with the same norms and values that have
proved successful in Southeast Asia,”5 it comes as something of a disappoint-
ment to ªnd that ofªcial statements, and the scholarship they generated, are
vague about what the association actually is or does. In view of ASEAN’s lon-
gevity, its apparent centrality to regional security in Southeast Asia, and its
procedurally driven transformation of foreign relations across East Asia in the
twenty-ªrst century, the uncertainty among its diplomats and its academic ad-
mirers about whether ASEAN is an organization, a discourse, or a community
of various hues represents something of a puzzle.
To unravel this puzzle, we seek to demonstrate that ASEAN remains what it
essentially was from its inception, namely an association of states created to
achieve the limited purpose of maintaining regional order. ASEAN was origi-
nally founded to establish the conditions of stability among a heterogeneous
grouping of weak postcolonial states in Southeast Asia, and subsequent at-
tempts to extend its associative modality beyond this limited goal leads only to
organizational ambiguity and academic incoherence. Thus, those in the associ-
ation or among its academic enthusiasts who seek to embellish it as a frame-
work for a more integrated ASEAN identity grounded in its distinctive norms
and processes and framed by its inimical discourse only succeed in creating
not a community but an illusion. Moreover, the attempt to project this illusion
into a wider East Asian Community only exacerbates the confusion envelop-
ing the behavior of ASEAN’s more powerful neighbors in Northeast Asia to-
ward the grouping.
To dispel the illusion, our analysis explores the evolving claims made on be-
half of ASEAN by both scholars and diplomats since its inception. From this
we outline its governing norms and identify the nature of the ASEAN process
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and the diplomatic structure this process has evolved. Having established
ASEAN’s guiding propositions and the cooperative practices they seek to
instantiate, we test their efªcacy in three discrete spheres of ASEAN engage-
ment: economic integration, intramural integration, and the creation of a wider
community. Three case studies exemplify this engagement: the Asian ªnancial
crisis and ASEAN’s response; ASEAN’s collective approach to the transna-
tional threat posed by the so-called war on terrorism in Southeast Asia; and
ASEAN’s diplomatic management of China’s claim to the sovereignty of the
Spratly Islands. ASEAN’s conduct in these three cases, we argue, reveals that
its consensus-driven, conºict-avoidance formula lends itself increasingly to
more powerful actors outside the region shaping ASEAN’s destiny. We further
demonstrate that the central lesson deduced from ASEAN’s distinctive diplo-
matic practice is that norms are essentially what states, pursuing their strategic
self-interest, make of them.
From Realism to Surrealism: From an “Embryonic” to a “Nascent”
Security Community
The early scholarship of regional security arrangements in Southeast Asia con-
trasts vividly with more recent commentary regarding the prospects for either
an enhanced or a more completely integrated ASEAN community. In the 1960s
and 1970s, scholars generally lamented the failure of attempts at regional secu-
rity cooperation and regarded the eventual formation of ASEAN in 1967 lim-
ited in both scope and utility. Assembled from the detritus of stillborn
attempts at post–World War II regional cooperation, notably the Southeast
Asian Treaty Organization, the Association of Southeast Asia, and Maphilindo,
the future grouping cobbled together elements of these tried and failed ar-
rangements into the ASEAN Declaration signed in Bangkok in August 1967.6
Here the ªve founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand) agreed “to accelerate the economic growth, social
progress, and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in
the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for
a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations.”7
That the grouping agreed to anything at all represented the symbolic resolu-
tion of a conºict over the postcolonial Southeast Asian regional order and In-
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donesia’s acceptance of the right of the recently decolonized states of Malaysia
and Singapore to a place in that order. Never more than an “intergovernmental
entity,” ASEAN demonstrated early on “a strong disposition against any su-
pranational tendency.”8 To the extent that the association possessed an iden-
tity, moreover, it emerged in response to the Indochina crisis occasioned by
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Vietnam’s actions breached ASEAN’s
1976 landmark Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which ostensibly up-
held the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member states as
the basis of regional cooperation, peace, and stability.
At the end of the Cold War, therefore, ASEAN stood revealed as a diplo-
matic community of weak states, and its collegial style represented the “insti-
tutional fruit” of subregional conºict resolution between 1976 and 1991. It
could also be viewed, Michael Leifer contended, as an “embryonic security
community” practicing cooperative security.9 By this Leifer meant a realist,
intraelite undertaking that reconciled previously conºicting states through its
machinery of dialogue, dispute management, and conºict avoidance. In this,
ASEAN’s practice contained “an evident dimension of balance of power”
within “an institutional framework of multilateral constraint” that actively
avoided solving intramural problems.10 Given the evident political, diplo-
matic, and economic difªculties confronting Southeast Asia after 1997, Leifer
urged caution in “drawing on ASEAN’s institutional experience as a model for
other regions.”11
Notwithstanding such caution, ASEAN’s international and regional diplo-
matic stature improved dramatically in the 1990s. The original ASEAN states
maintained both peace and impressive economic growth from 1985 to 1997.
From the late 1980s, too, a new generation of scholars challenged the realism
that informed the early scholarship of Southeast Asia’s evolution and diplo-
matic record. Attracted by ASEAN’s distinctive diplomatic style and con-
vinced that the “economic rise of Southeast Asia,” along with the rest of the
Paciªc littoral, had “proven itself a sound developmental model,”12 this new
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generation of scholars entertained the view that ASEAN’s practice might fash-
ion a wider East Asian order.
Indicative of this hermeneutic shift in ASEAN scholarship, the journal that
printed Leifer’s ªnal article, which questioned ASEAN’s ability to promote
collective regional security, also published, in the same issue, Nikolas Busse’s
thesis that ASEAN’s processes did, indeed, establish the basis for a wider re-
gional order. Disposing of Leifer’s “myopic” realist lens for a long-sighted,
constructivist alternative, Busse contended that a shared regional identity had
emerged from the “social practice and political interaction” of ASEAN and its
interlocutors.13 For Busse, ASEAN had evolved a distinctive “political culture”
in the course of the Indochina crisis. Subsequently, the process of engagement
with an emerging China after 1994 had extended ASEAN’s procedural norms,
establishing them as the basis of a wider regional order.
Following Busse, but abandoning a “parsimonious constructivism” in favor
of an all-embracing analytic eclecticism, Katzenstein also considered ASEAN
“processes of trust building . . . to be well under way” across the Asia-Paciªc.14
While Katzenstein warned that the construction of a regional identity might be
a work of decades rather than years, and neglected to specify the number of
states the region might include, other analysts were more prescriptive. Meth-
odologically informed by a heterogeneous mixture of constructivism, eclecti-
cism, and a growing interest in resurrecting an earlier functionalist account of
regional community formation via increased transactions, the new ASEAN
scholarship imagined the grouping evolving from an already established “dip-
lomatic community” into a “nascent security community.” This “nascent” se-
curity community, should not, however, be confused with Leifer’s earlier,
balance of power–oriented, embryonic one. For the new, ideationally driven
community theory proposed that dialogue engendering shared norms over
time breeds a shared regional identity.15
From this perspective, and in contrast to realism, a shared sense of weakness
rather than strength facilitated ASEAN’s capacity to transform the regional or-
der. Discourse conducted according to the nonlegalistic, consensus-oriented
ASEAN way that represented a distinctive alternative to European styles of di-
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plomacy would forge an ideational alternative, thereby inducing a collective
sense of “we-ness.”16 Interestingly, while those who adopted either a realist
or a constructivist lens to examine ASEAN agreed on the collective weakness
of the states that formed it, those of a transformational disposition seren-
dipitously discovered that state weakness produced positive ideational and
normative outcomes, culminating in an enhanced identity and purpose.
Furthermore, for a number of scholars, China’s growing enthusiasm for
normalizing regional relations through the ARF and APT processes gave evi-
dentiary support to the transformative possibilities of both the norms and the
distinctive diplomatic culture pervading this widening, distinctively non-
Western, regional grouping. This contrasted dramatically with China’s pre-
vious experience of the “unfair” international treaty system, considered
responsible for a century of humiliation at the hands of Western imperial pow-
ers between 1842 and 1949. Moreover, Japan’s growing enthusiasm for the
APT mechanism gave additional purchase to the new intellectual and political
frameworks encompassing the emerging regional reality. In January 2002
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proposed that East Asia should be-
come a “community” that “acts together and advances together.” Koizumi
contended that “East Asia’s whole can be greater than the sum of its parts,”
that Southeast and Northeast Asia’s political futures were entwined, and that
the APT framework should be the forum for this shared East Asian destiny.17
International relations theory, as it increasingly assumed a transformative
idiom in the course of the 1990s, thus found both ontological and empirical
justiªcation in the ASEAN process. ASEAN’s emergence in the context of
konfrontasi, to its role in the resolution of the Indochina crisis between 1978 and
1991, through the challenge posed by the Asian ªnancial crisis in 1997, to the
active community-building initiatives that both deepened ASEAN integration
and established the machinery of the APT to embrace a wider Northeast Asia
between 1997 and 2005 demonstrated institutional adaptation, the construc-
tion of shared norms, and a common identity mediated through the ASEAN
way.18
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Indeed, Alastair Iain Johnston maintained that the ASEAN way of regional
integration allowed states to establish an extremely low level of institutionali-
zation with a highly nonintrusive agenda. This, in turn, created a process of so-
cial interaction that allowed further institutional movement. Ironically, the
movement ASEAN generated “promises to negate it, as the ARF converges,
tentatively, with European-like models.” This rendered the whole process “a
happy myth.”19
Thus, the dominant understanding of ASEAN-driven regionalism came to
assume that, ªrst, a collocation of weak state actors engineered a set of proce-
dural norms and persuaded stronger regional actors to both adopt and adapt
to them; and second, these distinctively non-Western procedural norms and
processes have informed a practice of socialization that over time constructs
new and more inclusive identities, transforms interests, and establishes the lin-
eaments of a regional community. What, then, are these norms and processes?
And by what diplomatic mechanisms are they maintained and implemented?
Norms, Processes, and the ASEAN Way
The deªning ASEAN norm, identiªed in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation,
requires noninterference in the affairs of member states. All who conform to
the ASEAN process, therefore, accept the nonnegotiable inviolability of na-
tional sovereignty. Second, ASEAN eschews the use of force. The organization
resolves disputes peacefully. In 1971 ASEAN declared itself a zone of peace,
freedom, and neutrality and subsequently a nuclear weapons–free zone. These
norms are not unique. The 1949 United Nations Charter and the Nonaligned
Movement at its Bandung meeting in 1955 had expounded them prior to
ASEAN’s formation. The language of both the ASEAN Declaration and the
TAC, thus, reºects the internationalist and postcolonial values of the postwar
era.
What actually distinguishes ASEAN’s norms is not their content, but their
implementation in a framework of regional interaction. The ASEAN way, ac-
cording to Acharya, is “about the process through which such interactions are
carried out.”20 This process requires the cultivation of certain habits, notably,
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discretion, informality, expediency, consensus building, and nonconfrontation-
al bargaining. Consequently, the ASEAN way contrasts with the “adversarial
posturing” and “legalistic decision-making procedures” apparently found in
multilateral negotiations conducted according to Western diplomatic criteria.
A preoccupation with expediency and informality, itself a reºection of member
state weakness and insecurity, requires the practice of nonconfrontation and
acute sensitivity to the “comfort level” experienced by participants. The effort
to raise the comfort level entails the avoidance of open disagreement between
participants.21
Comfort, therefore, means either evading the discussion of bilateral disputes
between member states or addressing them obliquely in nonbinding “work-
shops,” second-track forums, and dialogue sessions. As one former ASEAN
secretary-general explained, “When ASEAN cannot solve a problem, what
does it do? First, it may put the problem under the carpet and not highlight
it.”22 This approach further required that multilateral discussions in ASEAN
ministerial meetings excluded issues of defense cooperation. Subsequently,
the ARF process required a conºict-avoidance strategy to inform all delibera-
tions concerning wider regional security. Rather than formal or legally binding
alliances, the ASEAN process promotes the practice of consultation and
consensus.
Consensus encourages a shared appreciation of the problem without neces-
sarily producing a shared approach to it. Agreement may be reached provided
nonadherents do not lose face in the process. Given the nonbinding character
of ASEAN agreements, those who dissent are rarely discomªted. The ASEAN
and ARF processes “[are] about agreeing to disagree rather than allowing dis-
agreement to cloud and undermine the spirit of regionalism.”23 This apparent
informality further entails that close interpersonal ties between leaders and se-
nior governmental ªgures trump rules and enforcement mechanisms. For
Acharya, “whilst ASEAN is not lacking regularized ministerial and bureau-
cratic consultations, it has not embraced the idea of a centralized permanent
bureaucracy with decision-making authority.”24 Indeed, ASEAN possesses no
clear format for decisionmaking, and meetings “often lack a formal agenda.”25
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informality or intergovernmentability?
The cumulative effect of these processes is a weak institutional framework.
Nevertheless, ASEAN has evolved a distinctively intergovernmental structure
over time. Since the fourth ASEAN summit in 1992, and given additional mo-
mentum by the APT, ASEAN has developed a complicated framework of
meetings and formal and informal summits to both discuss and agree on pol-
icy. Below this level, the annual ASEAN Ministers Meeting of foreign ministers
constitutes the intergovernmental “receptacle” of the “political sovereignties
of the regional arrangement.” Annual meetings of ASEAN economic and
ªnance ministers evolved to complement this format, which dates from
ASEAN’s founding. Since 1977 the ASEAN economic ministers and, in the af-
termath of the ªnancial crisis, the ASEAN ªnance ministers have also met an-
nually. The ASEAN Standing Committee coordinates the work of the
association between these annual meetings, and the ASEAN chair and vice
chair rotate on an annual basis among member states. The ASEAN Secretariat,
headed by the secretary-general of ASEAN, manages this complex arrange-
ment of formal and informal summits, dialogues, meetings, and standing com-
mittees. The secretary-general holds ofªce on a two-to-three-year renewable
term and is chosen from candidates proposed by member states. To im-
prove organizational efªciency in the aftermath of the ªnancial crisis and to
implement the 1998 post–ªnancial crisis Hanoi Plan of Action and the
2003 Vientiane Action Program, the ASEAN secretary-general received “an
enlarged mandate to initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN
activities.”26
The mandate responds to ASEAN’s dramatically accelerated policymaking
following the ªnancial crisis. After 1997, ASEAN summits agreed to a plethora
of protocols and action plans designed both to increase Southeast Asian inte-
gration and to establish a regional leadership role for the organization. They
embrace a prospectus ranging from relatively technical sectoral protocols to
declarations that reªne the character of the organization, such as the 2003
Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), which established a
framework to achieve an integrated ASEAN community, and the 2005 Kuala
Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter, which
would, when codiªed, afford the organization a legal persona. They also cover
framework agreements, such as those establishing an ASEAN investment area
in 1998 and an ASEAN development fund in 2005, that give substance to the
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organization’s 1997 Vision 2020 statement, and the Hanoi Plan of Action and
Vientiane Action Program to strengthen economic integration. Since 1997 the
ASEAN process has also established a structure governing ASEAN’s external
trade via framework agreements on economic partnership with Japan and In-
dia and a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity with China in 2003.
track-two diplomacy constructs an asean community
In constructing this normative order through the process of dialogue and trust
building, ASEAN scholars consider particularly inºuential the role that track-
two meetings and workshops—involving both diplomats and scholars—play
in clarifying the evolving character of the organization and extending its pro-
cesses into the ARF and the APT. Acharya argues that “an important feature of
regional security debates in ASEAN is the role of think tanks specializing in in-
ternational relations and security studies in sponsoring what has been called
second-track dialogues and discussions on regional security issues.”27
It is here that an evident incongruity appears in the discourse of ASEAN’s
normative evolution. For this informal process is neither unofªcial nor inde-
pendent. As Carolina Hernandez observes, the track-two process reºects an
evolving relationship between ASEAN and the various member states’ Insti-
tutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS). These institutes have, since
the formation of the ARF, developed close ties with ASEAN. Indeed, “ASEAN-
ISIS is the most important and visible peace and security–related track-two
mechanism in Southeast Asia.28 This “non-ofªcial dialogue process” has in-
creased dramatically in tandem with ASEAN’s regional proªle. Daljit Singh
calculated that by 1995 “there were 83 known Track Two multilateral dia-
logues compared with 17 Track One meetings.”29
Like the ofªcial ASEAN process itself, ASEAN-ISIS meetings widened their
scope in the course of the 1990s to embrace states outside ASEAN through the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Paciªc (CSCAP). In Sheldon
Simon’s opinion, “Because many national CSCAPs are very close to their gov-
ernments, CSCAP recommendations . . . provide added dimensions to ofªcial
government views.”30 CSCAP’s preventive diplomacy workshops, Simon
Making Process, Not Progress 157
27. Acharaya, “Culture, Security, Multilateralism,” p. 75.
28. Carolina A. Hernandez, “The ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP Experience,” in Sharon Siddique and
Sree Kumar, eds., The 2nd ASEAN Reader (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), p. 280.
29. Daljit Singh, “Evolution of the Security Dialogue Process in the Asia-Paciªc Region,” in
Siddique and Kumar, The 2nd ASEAN Reader, p. 287.
30. Sheldon W. Simon, “The ASEAN Regional Forum Views the Councils for Security Cooperation
in the Asia Paciªc: How Track II Assists Track I,” NBR Analysis, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 2002), pp. 16–
17.
maintains, helped advance the ARF process. More broadly, Acharya ªnds that
“while the ASEAN-ISIS played a key role in the direction of a formal process
of security dialogue, the CSCAP in which ASEAN-ISIS plays a major role, has
begun to provide similar inputs into the ARF.”31
Acharya accepts that regional “think tanks involved are . . . closely linked to
their respective national governments and rely on government for their aca-
demic and policy-relevant activities.”32 Hernandez further comments that “the
role of track-two diplomacy may be seen in the institutionalization of meetings
between ASEAN-ISIS policy-making structures such as ASEAN-SOM [Senior
Ofªcials Meeting] in the adoption of an overwhelming majority of its policy
recommendations by ASEAN.”33 Given the close relationship between the var-
ious member states’ Institutes of Strategic and International Studies and the
ASEAN and ARF processes, it is not altogether surprising to ªnd that the pre-
vailing academic orthodoxy regarding community building occurs through di-
alogue, and that normative transformation informs both the style and content
of ofªcial ASEAN pronouncements. In other words, as the ASEAN-ISIS pro-
cess gathered strength, the language of trust building, identity, norms, and
community found its way into ofªcial documents.
Thus, ASEAN’s Vision 2020 foresees Southeast Asia “bound by a common
regional identity.”34 Somewhat differently, the Bali Concord II redescribes the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in language that could be found in many un-
dergraduate course outlines in international relations. Consequently, the
ASEAN security community (ASC) subscribes “to the principle of compre-
hensive security.”35 It explores “innovative ways to increase its security and
establish modalities . . .which include, inter alia, the following elements: norms-
setting, approaches to conºict resolution, and post-conºict peace building.”36
Conºating the prevailing scholarship into a single mission statement, the 2005
Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter de-
sired “to realize an ASEAN Community,” and envisioned “ASEAN as a con-
cert of Southeast Asian nations; outward looking, living together in peace,
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stability, and prosperity, bonded together in partnership in . . . a community of
caring societies.”37
Academic forecasters of regional integration, such as Katzenstein and
Nobuo Okawara, argued that the relationship between regional scholarship
and regional organizations “socialize[s] elites either directly or indirectly to
different norms and identities,” and that the relationship between ASEAN-ISIS
has become an “important feature of Asia-Paciªc security affairs.”38 In fact, it
would seem that scholars who wish to see shared norms transforming identi-
ties and interests have written their ideological preferences into the organiza-
tion’s goals. Constructivism aside, however, words are not deeds. Central to
the case for ASEAN transforming both its member states and the wider region
is the contention that the process of meeting and dialogue in an atmosphere of
unstructured informality over time promotes trust, creates shared norms, and
induces a shared identity. This should be observable both in the changing
practice of the organization and in its manner of addressing a range of regional
economic and security problems.
One difªculty with this transformation appears almost immediately: the ac-
tual administrative practice of the organization, notwithstanding the enhanced
mandate of the ASEAN Secretariat, lacks any supranational capacity. In other
words, despite the proliferation of meetings, declarations, and protocols since
1997, the organizational structure of ASEAN remains essentially intergovern-
mental. The ASEAN-ISIS process, for example, works through, is dependent
on, and is accountable to generally illiberal member state governments.
An analogous pattern of state-driven interaction is evident in the areas of
economic and security cooperation within ASEAN. In fact, it is the staff of each
member state’s ASEAN National Secretariat, housed in their respective foreign
ministries, that proposes, and once accepted at a Heads of Government meet-
ing, disposes policy. Eighty percent of ASEAN business conducted by the Sec-
retariat’s machinery concerns fairly mundane technical and economic matters.
The press and ASEAN scholarship, by contrast, glamorize ASEAN’s political
role. The Secretariat forms the actual bureaucracy of ASEAN. Moreover, at this
level, what distinguishes the ASEAN process is not informality, but a high de-
gree of formality and hierarchy.
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The dissonance between an ofªcial declaratory intent of deepening ASEAN
integration and extending its nonbinding processes to the wider region, and
the actual intra-ASEAN policy practice that remains intergovernmental and
bureaucratic, has important implications not only for how ASEAN functions,
but also for the extent to which its aspiration to build a common regional iden-
tity based on shared norms can be realized. To explore this dissonance, we
examine ASEAN’s rhetorical and practical response to its ªnancial crisis.
ASEAN’s Economic Community and Its Regional Implications
In the early 1990s, the supercharged economic growth of Southeast Asia, to-
gether with the initiation of the process to form an ASEAN free trade area
(AFTA) seemed to presage what Singapore Home Affairs Minister George Yeo
somewhat misguidedly described in 1995 as a “new East Asian Co-Prosperity
Sphere.”39 This premonitory vision of an integrated East Asian economic re-
gion disintegrated in the deep recession brought on by the Asian ªnancial cri-
sis of 1997.
The crisis began in July when the Bank of Thailand failed to maintain the
baht peg to the dollar. The subsequent restructuring of the economy with the
aid of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue package of $18 billion wit-
nessed the bankruptcy of ªnancial institutions, manufacturing decline, rising
interest and unemployment rates, and a liquidity crunch. An analogous pat-
tern repeated itself with even more drastic political and economic conse-
quences in Indonesia, which saw the collapse of its ªnancial sector and a
number of government-linked conglomerates: it also undermined the author-
ity of Indonesia’s New Order regime. By contrast, Malaysia responded to the
collapsing ringgit by imposing currency controls and refusing an IMF rescue
package. The controversial strategy salvaged the authority of then Prime Min-
ister Mahathir Mohamad, but the unpredictable policy environment severely
dented Malaysia’s credibility among foreign investors. At the peak of the cri-
sis, World Bank Director Jean-Michel Severino calculated that $115 billion in
foreign direct investment had ºed Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand. The equivalent of 18 percent of gross domestic product
vanished from Southeast Asia and South Korea between June 1997 and
January 1998.40
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As the crisis developed, East Asian states pursued their own national inter-
ests, and recourse to a Darwinian survival of the ªttest appeared the only
shared regional value. Given that the immediate aftermath of the ªnancial cri-
sis revealed a Southeast Asia typiªed by political and economic fragility, the
response to the crisis affords a test of ASEAN’s capacity to develop an en-
hanced institutional framework, coupled with enforcement mechanisms for
pooling the economic sovereignty of ASEAN member states in a common
community, creating an ASEAN free market in goods and services, and inte-
grating areas where ASEAN may possess comparative advantages. This
would be measurable in terms of the growth of inter-ASEAN trade, the decline
in ASEAN’s dependence on both foreign direct investment and external mar-
kets primarily in the United States, the corresponding growth of an internal
market both within ASEAN and across the wider East Asian Community for
ASEAN products, and the growth of ASEAN domestic consumption.
asean and the southeast asian developmental state
As the ªnancial crisis demonstrated, ASEAN, as a regional economic group-
ing, was far from integrated. The structure of the more dynamic ASEAN econ-
omies were export oriented, and competed between themselves both for
foreign direct investment and as low-cost manufacturing bases for Northeast
Asian, European, or North American multinational corporations. Unlike in-
creasingly integrated markets such as the European Union (EU), where intra-
European trade among the core economies accounted for more than 60 percent
of total EU trade by the mid-1990s, intra-ASEAN trade represented a mere 20
percent of total ASEAN trade at the time of AFTA’s formation in 1992.
Moreover, moving from the optimism of the Asian miracle decade to
ªnancial crisis within a year constituted a shock to the model of state-led eco-
nomic development and left regional politicians and academics ºoundering
for explanations and solutions. In this context, the ASEAN orthodoxy holds
that even if attempts at economic integration had been largely ineffectual prior
to the crisis, the aftermath of the crisis encouraged both a deepening of
ASEAN integration and a widening of its processes to embrace Northeast
Asia. To what extent then has ASEAN built an integrated economic commu-
nity, one of the pillars of the 2003 Bali Concord II?
crisis, diagnosis, and asean’s response
The ªnancial crisis spawned two essentially contested understandings of what
happened. The prevailing economic orthodoxy maintained that the structural
features of the Asian economic model were the cause of the ªnancial melt-
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down. In this view, current account deªcits, a speculative property boom,
short-term borrowing to fund long-term investment, as well as poor banking
and ªnancial regulation, which ran the spectrum from the inept and opaque to
the fraudulent and corrupt, constituted a fundamental systemic fault. In 1997
the world markets severely punished this weakness.
By contrast, the market-unfriendly school, led by Prime Minister Mahathir,
and abetted by a curious range of supporters that included Paul Krugman,
Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, and Indonesia’s President Suharto maintained
that the crisis was a product of deregulated global capitalism. Having opened
their capital markets to global trade in the course of the 1990s, the new Asian
boys on the international currency trading bloc were the innocent victims of a
brutal mugging by a gang of spivish hedge fund managers and futures traders
in New York, Chicago, and London. From this perspective, there was little
wrong with the Asian developmental model that a few lessons in central bank-
ing and sovereign bond ºoating could not ªx.
It was Dr. Mahathir’s diagnosis that achieved increasing regional appeal. As
the meltdown spread from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia, most notably
South Korea, it induced a sense of collective humiliation. The formerly “high-
performing Asian economies,” as the World Bank report described Indonesia,
South Korea, and Thailand in 1995, had to endure the imposition of hitherto
unknown levels of ªnancial stringency in return for IMF aid. That Western
countries on the Asian periphery, such as Australia and New Zealand, along
with the United States (but also including China, India, and Taiwan), escaped
the worst effects of the economic contagion merely compounded the
humiliation.
Shame induced resentment. Proponents of enhanced regionalism main-
tained the IMF had aggravated the crisis through its “too harsh” demands for
economic restructuring and ªnancial reform.41 This version of the crisis served
the ideologically useful function of shifting the burden of responsibility onto
insensitive Western institutions and the malign impact of global capitalism.42
Consequently, designing Asian solutions for Asian problems would both en-
gender a greater sense of East Asian independence and strengthen regional
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economies against further externally induced shocks. As Deputy Prime Min-
ster of Thailand Supachai Panitchpakdi explained in 2000, “We cannot rely on
the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, or International Monetary Fund,
but we must rely on regional cooperation.”43
The years following the crisis therefore witnessed an upsurge in the rhetoric
of pan-Asian economic renewal. Scholars and diplomats saw a “need to revi-
talize multilateral institutions in the region,” because “only by strengthening
this cooperation can the East Asian region have some inºuence globally.”44 A
feeling of shared destiny and a commitment to renewal spurred ASEAN into
action. In the months following the outbreak of the economic crisis, ASEAN
sought to institute a dialogue partnership with the Northeast Asian states of
China, Japan, and South Korea. The sixth ASEAN summit, held in Hanoi in
December 1998, committed members to “a higher plane of regional coopera-
tion in order to strengthen ASEAN’s effectiveness in dealing with the chal-
lenges of growing interdependence within ASEAN and of its integration into
the global economy.”45
The same summit further agreed to formalize meetings with the Northeast
Asian states into the arrangement known as ASEAN Plus Three. The push for
greater East Asian institutionalization also produced a number of ideas to rein-
force economic cooperation. Japan proposed an Asian monetary fund spe-
ciªcally to address regional needs in a more effective and sensitive manner
than the IMF.46 Even more grandiose visions were ºoated, including an Asian
free trade area and a monetary union. Regionalist ardor reached its apogee
when Prime Minister Koizumi proposed in January 2002 that East Asia should,
indeed, evolve into a “community.”47
The 1997 ªnancial crisis, therefore, inspired numerous ofªcial declarations
of regional solidarity. Yet it was the APT that represented its lasting institu-
tional fruit, constituting the “embryo of an East Asian regional organiza-
tion.”48 The arrangement was intended as a vehicle to regenerate ASEAN.
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Moves toward a more developed sense of East Asian regionalism thereby en-
tailed a new and enhanced role for the association. As one of its proponents,
former Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas averred, the APT, like the prac-
tice informing the ARF, “should, at least during the initial phase, continue to
be ASEAN driven.”49 Following the ASEAN way, the process informing future
summits would be gradual, consensual, and nonbinding.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the APT arrangement was that it
symbolized an exclusive understanding of regional cooperation. Unlike more
open regional forums such as APEC (Asia-Paciªc Economic Cooperation), the
APT implicitly set the boundaries of “East Asia” in a way that excluded those
countries on the Asian periphery that were, ipso facto, deemed “external” to
the region. Those most obviously designated outsiders were Australia, New
Zealand, and the United States.
asean’s communitarian rhetoric versus its economic practice
Declarations of solidarity, of course, are frequently made for effect. Despite the
widely advertised ofªcial enthusiasm, caution should be exercised in assum-
ing the emergence of either a more integrated ASEAN economic market or a
wider regional one as a result of this rhetorical response. In fact, trans-Paciªc
economic and trade practice since ASEAN launched its various deepening and
widening initiatives reveals a rather different economic story than the ofªcial
version of growing integration tells. For central to the somewhat uncertain
economic revival of ASEAN since 2002 has not been any signiªcant deepening
of intra-ASEAN economic cooperation or the growth of a transparent regional
market for foreign investment, but rather the economic rise of China and the
ambivalent role it has come to play in ASEAN and the wider region’s political
economy.
China’s rapid growth since 1997 is the economic font of ASEAN’s bout of
post–ªnancial crisis pan-Asian enthusiasm. By 2003 the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development calculated that of $62 billion in
global foreign direct investment, China accounted for $52 billion.50 Its demand
for resources, automobiles, industrial parks, and apartments, as well as its
emergence as the globe’s low-cost manufacturing base for everything from
baseball caps and footwear to computers and televisions, revived growth
across Northeast Asia after 2002.
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This growth, however, has been a mixed blessing, especially for the ASEAN
economies. While China’s economic appetite has revived the high-technology
economies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, it has simultaneously sucked
investment out of the largely technology-less economies of Southeast Asia. The
rise of China after 1998, and its attraction for foreign investors, actually af-
fected growth negatively in Southeast Asia, whose low-technology manufac-
turing industries also depend upon foreign direct investment. In zero-sum
terms, ASEAN’s deteriorating foreign direct investment attractiveness reºects
the rapid growth of the Chinese “titan.” In 2003 ASEAN attracted only 16 per-
cent of Asian foreign direct investment compared with China’s 66 percent—
the exact reverse of the position in 1990.51 By 2004 Chinese competition had
devastated the Indonesian and Filipino garment and footwear industries.
Global brands such as Nike and Gap increasingly source China and Vietnam
for new supplies where “wages are lower and productivity higher.”52 As the
IMF observed, “Countries whose factor endowments are similar to China and
which . . . compete with it in world markets will need to undertake sizable ad-
justments and display ºexibility in product and labor markets.”53
asean’s norms and the failure to integrate its market
Flexibility has not been a feature of the ASEAN way in industrial policy.
Signiªcantly, the creation of an ASEAN free trade area, which ofªcially came
into existence in 2002, together with the Hanoi Plan of Action of 1998, which
accelerated the pace of integration by creating a common ASEAN investment
area, has failed to transform the trade practice of the ASEAN states. Nor
has it signiªcantly revived foreign investment ºows or established an inte-
grated ASEAN economic community.54 Although the six longest-standing
members—Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand—agreed in 1998 to a common effective preferential tariff scheme to
reduce levies on one another’s goods to a maximum 5 percent, nontariff barri-
ers and excise duties remain in place. Numerous commodities are put on a
temporary exclusion list, a general exception list, and a sensitive list (that per-
manently excludes items from any liberalization).55 Many “trade sensitive”
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items are the object of continuous renegotiation, most notably by countries
such as Indonesia and Thailand, that will extend protection beyond the next
decade. A cursory examination of the protocols and framework agreements es-
tablishing common trade and customs practice across ASEAN reveals that
very few are signed by all member states, which illustrates the process of
nonbinding consensus, but does little to integrate the regional economy.
More particularly, where manufacturing industries might beneªt from econ-
omies of scale and an integrated internal market, ASEAN governments remain
intransigently protectionist. Malaysia insists on protecting the state-owned au-
tomobile maker Proton, oblivious to the growing preference among patriotic
Malays to pay an extra $10,000 for a Toyota that has a higher propensity to
start.56 The Philippines protects its ailing petrochemical industry, while rice,
the region’s staple, is excluded from AFTA altogether. That AFTA and the
ASEAN investment area have had a minimal impact on regional integration
receives further conªrmation from the ASEAN Secretariat’s home page de-
voted to trade. It observes that “while trade with traditional industrial markets
remained robust, [the] share of intra-ASEAN trade remained low with intra-
ASEAN exports constituting 23.3 percent in 2001. The share was 21.4 percent
in 1993 when AFTA was formed.”57 Furthermore, in those areas where a rela-
tively free ºow of goods occurs, it appears that lower-cost ASEAN bases for
manufacturing, such as Vietnam, take investment away from more expensive
regional “partners,” such as Indonesia and the Philippines.
To the extent that the ASEAN economies have grown since 2002, it has been
a result of both their diminished role as a low-cost base for manufacturing
goods assembled in Southeast Asia for export to the United States and Europe,
and their emerging role as a supplier of commodities to China. Therefore,
although trade with China rose by 18 percent in 2002, this reºected China’s in-
satiable demand for the region’s raw materials, not for its low-cost manufac-
turing. ASEAN, unlike Northeast Asia, has had little success in exporting
higher value-added products to China. Ironically, former Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir revealed the problematic character of intra-Asian trade in
2001, warning of the danger posed by the unfettered ºow of imported goods
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from China.58 Nevertheless, ASEAN proceeded to negotiate a framework for
economic partnership with China the following year.
Even more signiªcantly, the more market-oriented states in the region in-
creasingly act autonomously of AFTA, exploring preferential trade deals both
within and beyond the region. As John Ravenhill argues, the Japan-Singapore
Economic Partnership Agreement in January 2003 constituted a “dramatic . . .
turn in East Asia to preferential trade.”59 The conclusion of bilateral trade
deals between Singapore and New Zealand, and Singapore and Australia, as
well as between Thailand and Australia followed. ASEAN’s poor record of
trade integration “has been punctuated by some member states ºouting even
its modest demands” and provides “little reason for conªdence that rapid
progress will be made” across the broader Asia-Paciªc.60 Bilateralism has al-
tered both the direction and pattern of trade in the region and illustrates that
ASEAN’s most developed countries, Singapore and Thailand, are concentrat-
ing on their own markets and “depriving ASEAN of its best integrators in the
process.”61 The recourse to bilateralism in practice, while paying lip service to
economic integration at the annual meetings of ASEAN’s economic ministers,
reveals profound differences over regional economic cooperation. Singapore
evidently favors trade liberalization while other ASEAN states, such as Malay-
sia, tend toward mutual technical and economic assistance seemingly aimed at
developing a “fortress Asia” bloc.62 Consequently, integrative schemes for an
Asia free trade area, an Asian monetary fund, and an ASEAN development
fund are largely cosmetic.
At the same time, meltdown and recession have dramatically altered the
economic landscape of Southeast Asia, but not in the way proponents of an in-
tegrated ASEAN market assume. Prior to the 1997 ªnancial crisis, it was plau-
sible to speak of shared developmental commonalities such as export-oriented
growth dependent on Japanese foreign direct investment, technocratic plan-
ning, single-party rule, and a governed labor and domestic market. Since 1997
the strategies adopted to deal with the meltdown, particularly in Southeast
Asia, have created distinctive differences among the ASEAN political econo-
mies that presage not greater integration but growing disparity. With a num-
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ber of ASEAN’s core components undermined by the crisis of 1997, the
direction in which the wider Asian economic model moves can no longer be as
smoothly interdependent or as export oriented as it was before the ªnancial
crisis era. Southeast Asia, in particular, is less dependent on Northeast Asian
investment and increasingly reliant on Western foreign investment. Between
2001 and 2005, foreign direct investment ºows from the West, most notably the
United States and the EU, grew to 44 percent. Meanwhile that from Japan fell
below 10 percent, while China’s investment in the region was negligible. Here,
moreover, ASEAN faces increasing competition with China and its far greater
attraction to fund managers.63
Finally, any attempt to broaden East Asian economic and ªnancial integra-
tion has to take into account that, since 2001, economic growth in East Asia has
become even more dependent on U.S. consumption and Western foreign in-
vestment. East Asia’s high savings rates and budget surpluses, after 1998, to-
gether with central bank interventions in the foreign exchange markets to keep
currencies cheap, support both the U.S. current account deªcit and the dollar.
Ultimately, governments across the Paciªc littoral and particularly in China
seek to bring the Asian labor pool into efªcient employment by encouraging
inward direct investment. For export-led growth, East Asia requires accommo-
dating markets and willing inward investors. The United States is the most ac-
commodating ªnal market and the most willing inward investor. In a Faustian
bargain, the Asian economies necessarily ªnance the United States’ twin
deªcits as a form of collateral against the direct investments they receive from
multinational conglomerates. The United States is Asia’s consumer of ªrst and
last resort.
In other words, despite the post–ªnancial crisis enthusiasm for deeper re-
gional integration elaborated in the Bali Concord II in 2003, there is little to
sustain its vision of a “stable, prosperous, and highly competitive ASEAN eco-
nomic region in which there is a free ºow of goods, services, [and] invest-
ment.”64 Instead, ASEAN remains a fragmented market hampered by “high
transaction costs and an unpredictable policy environment.”65 As the 2006
“Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter” lamented,
“ASEAN’s problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, or action plans. The
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problem is one of ensuring compliance.”66 Here, ASEAN’s norms and pro-
cesses have hindered the creation of an integrated market and failed to address
its member states’ continuing dependence on external markets. Consequently,
the rise of China and to a lesser extent India, together with Japan’s aversion to
technology transfer, leaves ASEAN between an investment-friendly rock and a
technology-free hard place.
If an ASEAN-driven multilateral approach to regional economic integration
looks long on vision and short on practical implementation, what of ASEAN’s
attempt to build a stable and prosperous Asia by its evolution into a security
community and by the extension of its processes through the ARF into the
wider Asia-Paciªc?
Nontraditional Security Threats and the ASEAN Security
Community
The ASEAN security community promulgated in the Bali Concord II seeks to
resolve intrastate and transnational security threats without violating respect
for territorial integrity outlined in the TAC. The ASC, therefore, envisages co-
operative security deepening ASEAN integration without undermining the
sovereignty of member states. Historically, security community theory consid-
ered threats to regional order state-based. Since the end of the Cold War,
however (especially after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001), nontradi-
tional threats such as haze pollution from burning rain forests in the Indone-
sian provinces of Kalimantan and Sumatra, the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome epidemic in 2002–03, Avian inºuenza, and transnational terrorism
challenged the individual and collective security of the ASEAN states. In the
case of terrorism, intraregional groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a re-
gional franchise of al-Qaida, seeks to transform, by violence, the ASEAN states
into a Darul Islam Nusantara (an Islamic realm of Southeast Asia), which di-
rectly threatens the ASEAN norms of noninterference and peaceful conºict
resolution. After 2000, JI’s attacks on soft targets across the region transformed
Southeast Asia from a zone of peace into the second front in the so-called
global war on terrorism.
The ASC represents a collective response to nontraditional threats such as
terrorism. It is plausible to test whether declarations of a common resolve to
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overcome an intraregional threat have enhanced multilateral cooperation and
engendered a denser web of inter-ASEAN security cooperation. Security com-
munity theory of a constructivist or neofunctionalist provenance assumes that
ASEAN would evolve common structures of intelligence gathering and shar-
ing, intra-ASEAN police cooperation, and a shared regional approach to the
problem.67 The security community paradigm, as ASEAN has applied it intra-
regionally, maintains the centrality of norms in regulating interstate behavior.
In a security community, norms should enhance regional cooperation against a
common security threat. This, however, is precisely what we do not ªnd. In the
case of Southeast Asia, shared norms have not engendered a sense of unity in
the face of regionally generated transboundary threats that the ASC collec-
tively faces. In practice, as opposed to ASEAN rhetoric, responses have re-
mained steadfastly bilateral and extraregional.
asean’s discourse on terrorism
At the discursive level of ASEAN summitry, the organization, of course,
evinces a sense of collective purpose. ASEAN responded to the September 11
attacks and the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005 with a series of declarations
outlining a common stance. The 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counter
Terrorism required ASEAN states to strengthen national mechanisms to com-
bat terrorism, deepen cooperation in the areas of intelligence sharing and law
enforcement, and develop regional capacity-building programs to enhance the
capabilities of member countries to investigate, detect, monitor, and report ter-
rorist activities.68
Following the Bali bombings of October 12, 2002, a further ASEAN declara-
tion reiterated ASEAN’s commitment to ªghting terrorism through enhanced
cooperation and established a regional counterterrorism center in Kuala
Lumpur. In 2004 the Vientiane Action Program announced a mutual legal as-
sistance agreement (MLAA) in criminal matters relating to terrorism, a con-
vention on counterterrorism, as well as an ASEAN extradition treaty to
improve counterterrorism cooperation. All member states signed the MLAA.
ASEAN additionally sought to combat terrorism by cooperating with states
outside the region. In August 2002 ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration for Co-
operation to Combat International Terrorism with the United States. This com-
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mitted both parties to a series of counterterrorism initiatives with a proviso
that safeguarded the national sovereignty of ASEAN states.
This preoccupation with the noninterference norm is curious given the
transnational character of the threat ASEAN faces. Indeed, despite ASEAN’s
efforts to forge a common response to the threat, the association, somewhat
problematically, failed to agree on a common deªnition of the terrorist threat
they confront.69 Rather than integrating, ASEAN’s institutional machinery for
countering terrorism remains intergovernmental, managed by the ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime. Reºecting this approach, the
MLAA recognizes that intergovernmental assistance may decline if its provi-
sion affects “the sovereignty, security . . . or essential interests of the Requested
Party.”70 Therefore, any intelligence and information exchange central to iden-
tifying, monitoring, and disrupting terrorist activity occurs at the subregional
level.71 Thus, the limited successes in curtailing regional terrorism reºect bilat-
eral and trilateral cooperation between ASEAN states or, alternatively, be-
tween ASEAN states and states outside the ASC, and not an integrated
community approach. This has implications for the manner in which ASEAN,
or more precisely individual ASEAN states, respond to the shared threat.
the domestic drivers of asean security practice
As bilateral and intergovernmental approaches prevail by default, domestic
political issues combined with suspicion of external interference trump any ef-
fort to construct a comprehensive ASEAN counterterrorism policy. The 2002
Trilateral Agreement [between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines] on
Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures to co-
operate in combating terrorism and transnational crime, subsequently signed
in 2003 by Brunei, Cambodia, and Thailand, illustrates this. The agreement re-
quires greater intelligence sharing, joint antiterrorism exercises, and combined
operations to hunt suspected terrorists especially across the borderlands be-
tween Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, where various long-
standing ethnoreligious conºicts mutated during the 1990s into franchises of
JI. Yet, the reluctance of governments to alienate domestic constituencies, coor-
dinate joint responses to cross-border terrorist activity, or even maintain effec-
tive border controls means that terrorism within this critical geopolitical zone
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proliferates. In December 2004, despite the nonbinding agreement, continuing
support for the separatist insurgency in southern Thailand from across
the border in the Malaysian state of Kelantan prompted former Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra to condemn the failure of the Malaysian govern-
ment to curtail transborder radical Muslim activity.72
Elsewhere, cooperation between Thai and Singaporean, and Singaporean
and Indonesian, intelligence agencies resulted in some success in detaining
key members of the Singaporean JI cell in Bangkok, Thailand, and the Riau Is-
lands of Indonesia. Even so, the most telling disruption of JI occurred not as a
result of intra-ASEAN cooperation, but through individual ASEAN govern-
ments collaborating bilaterally with non-ASEAN states outside the region.
Thus, a joint U.S.-Thai operation secured the arrest of the strategic coordinator
of al-Qaida activity in Southeast Asia, Riduan “Hambali” Isamuddin, in
Bangkok in August 2003. U.S. cooperation with the Indonesian police force
also helped develop Indonesia’s counterterrorist Detachment 88. Meanwhile,
it was cooperation between the Australian federal police and the Indonesian
police that eventually uncovered and disrupted the JI cell responsible for the
Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005 and the Marriot Hotel and Australian embassy
bombings in Jakarta in 2003 and 2004.
Ironically, while ASEAN states require external assistance to sustain an
effective counterterrorism strategy, a debilitating interagency rivalry char-
acterizes relations between Southeast Asia’s security services.73 In practice,
moreover, domestic political considerations and an obsessive concern with na-
tional sovereignty frustrate intergovernmental or bilateral counterterrorism
initiatives, not to mention any notion of a grander communitarian security
strategy. Thus, in Indonesia, the epicenter of regional terror, the uncertain pro-
cess of democratization since 1998 has ampliªed domestic political sensitivi-
ties. No politician can afford to alienate the Muslim mainstream by an
overvigorous response to radical Islamic proselytizing. During President
Megawati Sukarnoputri’s 2001–04 tenure of ofªce, Indonesia retracted its ear-
lier support for the war on terrorism when public opinion opposed interna-
tional military operations in Afghanistan in 2001. Throughout Megawati’s
incumbency, the government refused to acknowledge the existence of JI. By
contrast, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s more energetic prosecution
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of homegrown terrorism after his election in 2004 reºected a carefully orches-
trated campaign to establish his strong leadership credentials.
Somewhat differently, Filipino President Gloria Macagapal Arroyo used the
rhetoric of the global war on terrorism to build closer ties with the United
States. Arroyo’s pledge to ªght terrorism secured a military aid package and
garnered international backing for the more forceful prosecution of the en-
during internal problem of Moro separatism in the southern province of
Mindanao. Like Indonesia, the Philippines avoids closer cooperation with
neighboring Southeast Asian states. Instead, it has enhanced bilateral coopera-
tion with the United States and Australia to develop its capacity to conduct
counterterrorism operations.
In Thailand, too, after 2003, domestic political factors motivated Prime Min-
ister Thaksin Shinawatra’s support for the international campaign against ter-
rorism. An incident similar to Bali’s on Thai soil would devastate Thailand’s
tourism industry, which accounts for more than 7 percent of its gross domestic
product.74 Consequently, Thailand, like the Philippines, has established closer
links with the United States through the joint Counter Terrorism Intelligence
Center, established in 2001. U.S.-Thailand counterterrorism cooperation is
more openly apparent in annual joint military exercises such as Known War-
rior and Cobra Gold, which focus on building the Thai military’s capacity to
combat the growing insurgency in southern Thailand.
Singapore’s counterterrorism response has likewise entailed deepening se-
curity ties with the United States. The United States Paciªc Command Joint In-
telligence Center regularly shares information with Singapore’s Joint Counter
Terrorism Center. Closer ties with the United States, however, have also served
the domestic political interests of the ruling People’s Action Party. Singapore’s
externally oriented economy relies heavily on foreign direct investment, which
would suffer dramatically if the city state experienced a terrorist attack.
Singapore’s support for the war on terrorism reºects the pragmatic need to
maintain investor conªdence in the city state.
Across the causeway, Malaysia, like Indonesia—though in contrast with
Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore—has demonstrated ambivalence
about the U.S.-led war on terrorism. Here, too, internal security considerations
prevail in the majority Muslim-populated federal state’s conduct of counter-
terrorism policy. Prime Minister Mahathir notably used the war on terrorism
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to reestablish relations with the United States, which had soured during the
1990s.75 Mahathir denounced Islamist terror after the September 11 attacks,
and in May 2002 signed a memorandum of understanding with the United
States to enhance law enforcement and intelligence cooperation. Following
Mahathir’s resignation in 2003, Malaysia’s new prime minister, Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, pledged Malaysia’s continuing support for the war against
terrorism.76 Malaysia, like Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand,
has not established any collaborative working relationship with its neighbors
to counter regional terrorism.
Therefore, despite the rhetorical commitment to deepening regional security
ties, the core ASEAN states have in practice cooperated with the United States
in the area of law enforcement or intelligence gathering to maintain their coun-
terterrorism response. By contrast, counterterrorist police cooperation among
the core ASEAN states is minimal. To the extent that cooperation occurs at the
bilateral level between ASEAN states, it is hampered by mutual suspicion and
domestic preoccupations. This severely impedes ASEAN’s ability to develop a
collective response to the dangers of regional terrorism. An evident dissonance
appears between ofªcial declarations of community solidarity and the domes-
tically driven responses undertaken by member states to transnational threats.
Signiªcantly, ASEAN norms have not enhanced regional counterterrorism
cooperation. Counterterrorism policy continues to safeguard state sovereignty.
Moreover, the bilateral conduct of regional counterterrorism cooperation, pri-
marily with the United States, impairs the development of more solid regional
networks required of a security community.
failed response to transboundary environmental threats
The contradiction between ofªcial consensus and actual practice is not con-
ªned to the ASC’s regional terrorism policy. A similar dissonance affects the
ASEAN response to regionally generated transboundary problems such as air
pollution.77 Indonesian farmers and plantation owners are the main source of
the land and forest ªres that causes the pollution that perennially envelops
Singapore and much of peninsular Malaysia. To address the problem, ASEAN,
following its consensus-seeking norm, convened a number of meetings. The
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ªrst, in 1990, arrived at the Kuala Lumpur Accord on the Environment and
Development. Further meetings and agreements followed. The 1995 Regional
Action Plan on Transboundary Haze, however, failed to stop the most extreme,
costly, and life-threatening haze of 1997. These largely ineffectual initiatives
culminated in the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.
Although the agreement emphasizes the importance of monitoring and pre-
venting haze pollution, somewhat problematically, like all ASEAN agreements
it lacks any mechanism of enforcement or deterrence. That the main source of
pollution, Indonesia, has yet to sign the agreement compounds this limitation.
ASEAN and China’s Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in the South
China Sea
If the ASEAN economic community approach to regional integration looks
long on rhetoric and short on implementation, and its evolution into a
Southeast Asian security community compromised by the domestic preoccu-
pations of member states, what of ASEAN’s attempt to build a stable East
Asian order by projecting its norms into the wider Asia-Paciªc?
The security community presumption contends that the organization’s di-
plomacy in the ASEAN Regional Forum and ASEAN Plus Three processes can
address protracted security issues in Northeast Asia. Those who promote
ASEAN’s normatively driven process of nonbinding consensus assume that
over time it will transform regional ºashpoints into disputes amenable to
peaceful resolution. To assess ASEAN’s effectiveness as a security community
in this wider domain, we next examine how ASEAN norms addressed China’s
territorial claim to the South China Sea and its resources, a claim that directly
impinges on the maritime boundaries of several ASEAN states and Taiwan
and has implications for international sea-lanes of vital importance to both
Japan and the United States, as well as to their perceptions of the APT process.
asean’s security dilemma in the south china sea
The source of the South China Sea dispute may be traced to the San Francisco
peace agreement of 1951, which failed to stipulate possession of the Spratly
Islands after Japan relinquished its title to them following its defeat in World
War II. The Spratlys’ contested ownership developed into an international
conºict in the wake of the resolution of the Indochina crisis and as a result of
overlapping sovereignty claims to the islands and their maritime resources.
That a number of claimants began extracting resources from the seabed contig-
uous to their claims from the mid-1970s exacerbated the conºict, especially af-
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ter rapid economic growth turned China into a major oil and gas importer
after 1992.
Taiwan has occupied the largest island in the group (Itu Aba) since 1956. Be-
tween 1968 and 1972, as the Cultural Revolution distracted the Chinese, both
the Philippines and Vietnam took the opportunity to occupy six islands each in
the South China Sea. By 1992 the Philippines had seven oil wells in produc-
tion and Vietnam one. Meanwhile in 1979, Malaysia began offshore oil explo-
ration in the vicinity of Swallow Reef and by 1990 had ninety oil-producing
wells in its exclusive economic zone. The small Sultanate of Brunei also
claimed Louisa Reef adjacent to its shoreline and exploited its oil resources. All
these states together with Indonesia, which disputes areas of both the South
China Sea and Sulawesi Sea with Malaysia, have failed to resolve their bilat-
eral and sometimes trilateral maritime boundary disputes through the ASEAN
process.
ASEAN did, however, apply its consultative machinery to the problem after
1990, and the Manila Declaration of July 1992 asserted that disputes should be
resolved peacefully and cooperatively in the spirit of the TAC. Signiªcantly, it
was China’s growing interest in the South China Sea that concentrated
ASEAN’s collective mind. In February 1992 China’s Law of the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zones laid claim to the entire South China Sea on the basis of
its historical right to the area dating from the Xia dynasty, which ruled be-
tween the twenty-ªrst and sixteenth centuries b.c.78 ASEAN’s Manila Declara-
tion thus represented the ªrst effort of the organization’s decade-long attempt
to enmesh China in habits of regional good citizenship through participation
in nonbinding and nonconfrontational workshops on Managing Potential
Conºicts in the South China Sea.79 These workshops mutated after 1994 into
the centerpiece of ASEAN’s collective diplomacy toward China, the ASEAN
Regional Forum. This, too, adopted a “non-confrontational and process-
oriented approach” that deferred “issues that do not lend themselves easily to
compromise” in an attempt to engage China in a “broad security-oriented
dialogue.”80
Despite attending ASEAN colloquies between 1992 and 1999, China rejected
attempts to address the South China Sea issue multilaterally. Instead, preoccu-
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pied with its lost territory and suspicious of the international treaty system,
China insisted on a bilateral approach to what was “a truly multilateral dis-
pute.”81 Further, China’s international behavior indicated “Beijing’s willing-
ness to use force as an instrument of foreign policy.”82 China’s occupation of
Mischief Reef in 1995, challenging the Philippine claim to an exclusive eco-
nomic zone, furnished ASEAN with direct proof of China’s uncompromising
approach to recovering lost territory.
Although China signed the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Seas
(UNCLOS) in 1996, attended ASEAN-sponsored workshops, and participated
in the ARF, it continued to build its presence on Mischief Reef. China’s in-
creasing power relative to Southeast Asia and its propensity to assert its claims
unilaterally presented ASEAN with a classic security dilemma. As Liselotte
Odgaard observes, the dispute brought “to the fore incompatibilities between
the practices China and the countries of Southeast Asia normally employ to
ensure peace and stability in their regional environment.”83 The difªculty in
reconciling the historically based claims advanced by China, Taiwan, and
Vietnam to the Spratlys with those that applied the norms of international
law (particularly those established by UNCLOS and advocated by Brunei,
Malaysia, and the Philippines) exacerbated these incompatibilities. Despite
signing UNCLOS in 1996, China refused to address the various competing
claims on anything other than a bilateral basis. That some members of
ASEAN, notably Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam between 1995 and
2000, acceded to China’s bilateral blandishments, rather than supporting
ASEAN’s collective diplomacy, compounded the weakness of the ARF
process.
china’s comfort with asean’s conºict avoidance
Signiªcantly, during the Asian ªnancial crisis, China moderated its “righ-
teous” claims to the South China Sea.84 After 1998 China displayed an increas-
ing sympathy for the ASEAN view that intractable disputes should be shelved
and peacefully resolved according to the formula intimated in the Manila Dec-
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laration of 1992 and reafªrmed at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Jakarta,
in July 1996. China also indicated its agreement in principle to the joint devel-
opment of the South China Sea’s economic potential. This growing comfort
with the ASEAN process further manifested itself in 2002 in the signing of the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. The declaration
reafªrmed UNCLOS, the TAC, and China’s ªve principles of peaceful coexis-
tence. The parties in conformity with these norms eschewed the use of force,
assumed a practice of self-restraint, and sought to build an atmosphere of trust
and cooperation through dialogue and joint initiatives.85
In November 2002 China and ASEAN agreed to the creation of the ASEAN-
China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity and the Framework
Agreement on ASEAN-China Economic Cooperation. In 2003 China signed
the TAC, a document whose preoccupation with national sovereignty and
noninterference in the internal affairs of member states seemed only to rein-
force what China viewed as the basic principles of peaceful coexistence. All
these agreements in keeping with ASEAN practice were nonbinding and thus
committed China to very little. Nevertheless, that China had apparently
shifted from norm-avoiding to norm-afªrming behavior in relation to the ARF
and APT processes seemed to support the view that an ASEAN-driven secu-
rity community could transform both state interests and regional identity and
secure peaceful cooperation through its process of dialogue and consensus.
Regional scholarship contended that the Declaration on the South China
Sea connoted a paradigm shift in China’s foreign policy from unilateralism
to multilateralism, or in Chinese terms a “good neighborliness policy”
(mulin zheng ci)86 enabling China-ASEAN relations to go “from strength to
strength.”87 From this normative perspective, China had limited “its own sov-
ereign interests for the sake of engagement in multilateral frameworks and
pursuit of greater regional interdependence.”88 In this view, China’s interest in
multilateralism indicated its constructively redeªned desire to become a status
quo state within the prevailing regional order.89
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asean norms: serving china’s interest
For commentators to place this interpretation on the ARF process is highly
misleading. Despite signing the Declaration on the South China Sea, China
avoided any commitment to a legally binding code, and did not relinquish its
historical claim to its lost territory or its preference to resolve the dispute bilat-
erally. Rather, China moderated the manner in which it addressed ASEAN.
After 1998 its approach shifted from a “hard” to a “soft” line.90 China’s fourth-
generation leadership’s advocacy of the good neighborliness policy symbol-
ized this shift. China had not, therefore, abandoned its goal of achieving
control over the South China Sea or, by extension, securing a wider regional
hegemony. Instead, it had prudentially adjusted the means by which it pur-
sued its grand strategy. The pragmatic accommodation of ASEAN’s desire for
nonbinding consensus on the South China Sea, moreover, facilitated China’s
capacity to address more pressing strategic concerns. The hard line China pur-
sued prior to 1998 exacerbated these concerns. More precisely, agreement with
ASEAN permitted China to separate its claim to the Spratly Islands from its
claim to sovereignty over Taiwan, which had become entwined with the South
China Sea dispute by China’s aggressive occupation of Mischief Reef in 1995.
The hard line had additional negative implications for China’s strategic
goals. It had the potential to split the ASEAN membership, by driving the
Philippines into signing a visiting forces agreement with the United States in
1999. This, in turn, raised the undesirable possibility of U.S. involvement in the
Spratly dispute, which China preferred to treat as a neighborhood watch issue.
The soft line, by contrast, had the positive outcome of quarantining the prob-
lem of Taiwan. Signiªcantly, Taiwan was not a party to the 2002 declaration.
Adopting ASEAN’s nonconfrontational approach, China drew ASEAN into its
sphere of inºuence, while renewed emphasis on the region’s distinctive
ASEAN way effectively excluded the United States.
Meanwhile, the actual resolution of the dispute remains stalemated in the
ARF’s preferred strategy of managing problems rather than solving them. This
serves China’s rather than ASEAN’s long-term strategic interest. Conºict
avoidance plays into China’s hegemonic ambition of returning the region to its
precolonial order where the mandate of heaven exercises itself over the
Nanyang through a tributary arrangement with the various governments of
Southeast Asia, maintained through bilateral trade and policy ties.91 For with-
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The Spratly dispute demonstrates how more powerful actors can manipu-
late ASEAN’s pliable norms to advance their strategic interests. The maneu-
vering brought about by the ARF process, furthermore, has complicated the
strategic relationship between the United States, the three Northeast Asian
states, and ASEAN in ways that ASEAN evidently did not foresee. As the ARF
and APT processes evolved, they affected in different ways the strategic per-
ceptions of both the U.S. global hegemon and the competing regional
hegemons, Japan and China, which have never previously been powerful at
the same time. Indeed, if we reverse the dialectic of the APT and thereby un-
pack the rhetoric of regional community building, it becomes clear that the
APT and its unwieldy offshoot, the East Asian Community, has little to do
with constructing a shared East Asian identity and a lot to do with the realist
pursuit of state interests.
Norms and Illusions
Why, then, has what is essentially an illusion commanded so much ofªcial
rhetoric and scholarly devotion? Several reasons present themselves: ASEAN’s
communitarian ambitions emerged in a conducive environment that envis-
aged the erosion of a state-based order and its replacement by a normative
one; this engendered a self-justifying and self-reinforcing framework that em-
phasizes the process of transformation over the actual practice of statecraft;
and both weak and strong states have found it prudential to embrace this illu-
sion to advance their self-interest.
On the epistemological level, ASEAN norms and their expansive regional
projection occurred in a post–Cold War context that viewed such develop-
ments as both positive and inevitable. This has produced a widespread per-
spective that assumes the inexorable withering away of the state as the
primary unit in the international system. The goal of normatively driven inter-
national relations is to facilitate this inexorable transformation. Regionalism,
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from this perspective, constitutes “an important tool for promoting a range of
positive values” throughout the international system.93
This progress toward what John Rawls termed “realistic utopia” through in-
ternational law and shared norms is, of course, itself a normative construct.94
Ideational factors, norms, and denser networks of communication modifying
perceptions of material self-interest sustain this open-ended transformative
process. Equipped with a teleology that assumes a global “trend towards in-
trusive regionalism” resulting in the “development and mutual observance”95
of shared norms, the ASEAN-ISIS process consequently interprets events,
speech, acts, and foreign policy initiatives conªrming the transformation from
state interest to collective identity.
At the same time, this theorizing provides the ideological guarantee for the
process of security community building by acknowledging that the “transfor-
mation of identity and interest” is “incremental and slow.”96 Consequently, an-
alysts can dismiss impediments to shared identity formation, such as regional
terrorism, and the absence of denser networks to restrain it, as short-term de-
lays on the inexorable path to a rational order grounded in public reason.
Given this mind-set, regional interdependency in the Asia-Paciªc represents a
“basic truth,” and that it “is not in doubt that the process will foster the iden-
tity of an East Asian community.”97
Examining the discourse of contemporary East Asian regionalism ultimately
reveals a self-justifying and self-reinforcing framework. This is evident in the
way the prevailing constructivist idiom replaces the requirement to question
ruling assumptions with a policy-procedural description of the “institutionali-
sation of the ASEAN3 process.”98 Thus, despite empirical evidence to the
contrary, commentators maintain that “ASEAN is not as weak as it may seem,”
because it makes “an important contribution [to] the normative environment
of the region by reinforcing the fundamental principles of international soci-
ety.”99 The problem here is that the only “institutional principle” to which
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ASEAN is effectively committed is that of noninterference. Somewhat para-
doxically, the only fundamental principle of international society it has rein-
forced is a realist commitment to the inviolable sovereignty of the nation-state.
Moreover, this strange conjunction between the normative character of aca-
demic commentary, recent ASEAN declarations of unity and harmony, and the
essentially realist conduct of interstate diplomacy ultimately reveals the al-
ways aspirational discourse of community building. Viewing ASEAN in his-
torical perspective suggests the regional aspiration has presented itself in
many guises over time. ASEAN, the ARF, and the East Asian Community rep-
resent the culmination of visionary aspirations that may be traced through the
violently imposed East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere of the 1940s and even into
the precolonial period when imperial China sought to extend a tributary sys-
tem across its world of harmonious civilizational inºuence.
All these visions founder, however, when they confront the reality of global
politics and state-driven self-interest. Thus ASEAN’s schemes to promote
community even within Southeast Asia mask intense bilateral antipathies, a
lack of economic cohesion, and since 1997, conspicuous distrust, clearly evi-
dent in the regional response to transnational terror. The play of entrenched in-
terests is even more apparent in both the APT and the East Asian Community
processes.
What we observe, therefore, is the continual recasting of the regionalist proj-
ect in ever more implausible directions, but—Japan’s failed attempt to forcibly
incorporate an East Asian sphere during World War II notwithstanding—
anything solid quickly melts into discourse. Rather than asking why this might
be the case, regional junkies ªx their attention instead on the latest Asian re-
gional incarnation.
Conclusion: Norms Are What Strong States Make of Them
Regional scholars and diplomats maintain that ASEAN represents an evolving
economic and security community. They further contend that the norms the
distinctive ASEAN process implemented over time transformed Southeast
Asia and are in the process of building a shared East Asian identity. ASEAN’s
deeper integration into an economic, political, and security community and its
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extension into the ASEAN-driven APT process after 1997 offer an interesting
test of the dominant assumptions in both ASEAN scholarship and liberal, ide-
alist, and constructivist accounts of international relations theory. The latter
maintains that the future of international relations requires regional identities
to progressively replace self-interested, state-based ones. A process of dis-
course would transform state interests into shared norms creating the ideation-
al basis of a shared identity. Nation speaking unto nation would see states
evolving progressively into postnational constellations. This teleology that
came to profoundly inºuence the discipline of international relations after the
Cold War found its exempliªcation in the evolution of ASEAN and its muta-
tion into the East Asian Community. In the eyes of such observers, this other-
wise obscure association of weak states seemed in the course of its forty-year
history to epitomize the positive transformative impact that norms could
achieve, ªrst in Southeast Asia’s identity, then in the wider region.
To test whether ASEAN was in fact transforming both itself and the wider
regional identity, we examined the evolution of ASEAN scholarship and its
understanding of both ASEAN as an organization and its norms and pro-
cesses. Problematically, however, we found that those who advanced the view
that ASEAN has transformed itself into a nascent security community sedu-
lously attended to ASEAN declaratory rhetoric and the processes that in-
formed ASEAN diplomacy, but failed to acknowledge that the statements East
Asian political leaders made afªrming a commonality of interests needed “to
be read in the particular context in which they were made.”100
That scholars who endorsed and promoted the ASEAN way were them-
selves imbricated in the process only added to the suspicion that there was a
contradiction between ofªcial rhetoric and countervailing reality. This scholar-
ship, informed by a norm-endorsing methodology, replaced hypothesis testing
with thick description. This we found actually obscures how declaratory state-
ments are applied in ASEAN practice.
The three case studies we examined of intra- and extra-ASEAN diplomatic
and economic practice revealed that ASEAN’s norm of noninterference and its
practice of nonbinding consensus prevented deeper integration either within
ASEAN or the wider East Asian region. Thus, we found that while the ofªcial
view of ASEAN emphasizes its political role and the informal, unstructured,
cooperative, and consensus-oriented character of the organization, at the quo-
tidian level of policy formulation and implementation, the organization re-
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mains an essentially intergovernmental one, dealing primarily with trade and
economic issues and dominated by member state bureaucracies, rather than
one that possesses the institutional infrastructure to develop into a “mature”
security community or establish a common identity. This dissonance appears
in all our case studies. The actual intergovernmental practice that the com-
munity norms paradoxically reinforce undermines ofªcial declarations of
community and regional identity building.
Following this intergovernmental practice, ASEAN states pursue bilateral or
trilateral arrangements rather than building a supranational practice. This is
evident in the political economy of the ASEAN states, where theoretical lip
service to an ASEAN economic community masks an actual practice of bilat-
eral trade deals and the fragmentation of the regional market.
Analogously, the construction of a regional security community to address
transnational threats reveals bilateral ties and domestic considerations shaping
the regional terror response. Here, also, despite the rhetorical exclusion of the
United States at the summit level of ASEAN diplomacy, containing the threat
at the state level requires cooperation and evolving security ties with the
United States on an intergovernmental basis. This again negates building a
denser web of regional relations.
Meanwhile, extending conºict avoidance strategies to the wider East Asian
Community has not altered the strategic reality of the weakness of Southeast
Asian states individually and collectively. What appears to be a Japanese and
Chinese acculturation to these norms is far from it. Instead, these more power-
ful regional players manipulate ASEAN’s shared norms and nonbinding pro-
cesses for their own strategic advantage. For a more aggressive posture either
by Japan or China would have a countervailing effect: in Japan’s case it would
evoke memories of 1942, while China is still regarded with a certain amount of
regional suspicion.
Whatever strategic mutation ASEAN assumes in terms of its wider commu-
nity building, it can only mask the reality that weaker states cannot shape the
fates of stronger ones. Ultimately, ideational and normative constructivism
conceals how weak states making a virtue out of the necessity of weakness
cannot transform the practices of more powerful actors. Ultimately, the conºict
avoidance approach to intramural problems is unsustainable in a context
where such problems become increasingly transnationalized. What is revealed
in the case of the Spratlys and ASEAN Plus Three is that ASEAN norms facili-
tate the transformation of weaker states by stronger ones. Norms advanced by
an association of weak states in such circumstances can only be what stronger
states make of them.
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